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The Broken Generational Contract in Europe: Generous transfers 
to the elderly population, low investments in children
by Bernhard Hammer, Tanja Istenič and Lili Vargha
playing a particularly important role. In Europe, the transfers to 
the elderly population are predominately in the form of public 
transfers, of which pensions and health services are the largest 
components. There is an interrelationship between the intergen-
erational transfers to the child generation and the transfers to the 
elderly population. For a generation to receive public transfers in 
old age, it requires the transfers of resources to children in the first 
place, providing for their needs, upbringing and education. These 
transfers determine the human capital of the child generation, 
including their number, and thereby influence their productivity 
and their potential to contribute to the public transfer system.
However, as Gál et al. (2017) emphasise, there is an asymme-
try in the visibility of transfers between generations. While the 
public transfers to the elderly population are recorded in the 
central economic statistics such as National Accounts, the pri-
vate transfers to children are hardly visible in official statistics. 
The working-age population faces a trade-off between transfers 
to children, transfers to the elderly population and their own use 
of resources. There is the danger that the more visible, manda-
tory public transfers crowd out transfers to children and create 
an unsustainable imbalance of intergenerational transfers. Using 
bstract: Based on European National Transfer Accounts 
data from 2010, this paper quantifies and evaluates the 
balance of intergenerational transfer flows in 16 EU 
countries, including transfers in the form of unpaid household work. 
On average, the value of net transfers received by a child amounts to 
sixteen times the labour income of a full­time worker, and the net 
transfers received by an elderly person to six times the labour income of 
a full­time worker. Intergenerational transfers can be regarded as the 
reciprocal exchange between two generations: the size of the transfers 
to the child generation determines their potential to generate income 
and finance public transfers to the elderly population once they enter 
employment. We develop and calculate an indicator to analyse if there 
is a balance between transfers to children and transfers expected by the 
elderly population. The results indicate that in most of the analysed 
countries the human capital investments in children are far too low to 
finance the generous transfers to the elderly population in the future.
Keywords: Generational Contract, Intergenerational Transfers, 
 National Transfer Accounts, Intergenerational Indicators
Introduction1
Periods of dependency in childhood and old age are characteristic 
of the human life course. The economic needs during these pe-
riods are largely covered through transfers from the working-age 
population. For children, the most important transfers are those 
from their own parents, with personal care and household services 
A
There is an interrelationship between the intergenera-
tional transfers to the child generation and the transfers 
to the elderly population.
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generational relationships is in the mind of politicians or transfer 
analysts when they refer to generational contracts. We therefore 
use this section to discuss and clarify the notion and the under-
lying concepts. 
We have identified two different types of concepts of generational 
contracts that are used in the literature and the public discourse. 
One of these concepts follows the basic logic of social contracts 
and describes intergenerational support as a hypothetical agree-
ment between different generations, without explicit reciprocal 
exchange between the contractual partners. The other concept 
uses the notion of a generational contract to describe intergen-
erational support as reciprocal, mutual exchange between indi-
viduals belonging to two different generations. Our own concept 
of a generational contract adapts the latter concept and describes 
intergenerational economic transfers as mutual exchange between 
generations as a whole, not as direct exchange between individuals 
belonging to different generations. Such conceptualisation ena-
bles us to account for the private and public part of the system of 
intergenerational support. Before we explain our own concept in 
detail, we briefly discuss the existing concepts.
The generational social contract
The notion of a generational contract in the meaning of a social 
contract is not often used in the scientific literature, but is of-
ten used in public discourse, in particular in Germany. It justifies 
the obligation of the current productive generations to finance 
the pensions and health services of the older generation by ar-
guing that future generations will provide the same service once 
the current productive generations retire (e.g. CECU 2018). The 
concept of the generational contract with the meaning of a social 
contract is derived from social contract theory, in which socio-po-
litical arrangements including the state as a whole are interpreted 
as if they were grounded in the consent of all members of socie-
ty (Kersting 2015). The intuitive idea of a “social” generational 
contract is that the redistributive mechanism of the welfare state 
is based on a hypothetical agreement of different generations or 
 cohorts (Lorenz-Meyer 1999). The popularity of the notion of a 
generational contract or solidarity contract between generations in the 
German-speaking world is based on its appearance in the so called 
Schreiber­Plan (Schreiber 1955), which contributed important el-
ements to German pension reforms in 1957. However, Schreiber’s 
original plan included also transfers to children and was designed 
as a defined-contribution-pay-as-you-go pension system, with the 
yearly adjustment of benefits to match total contributions. The 
concept of a social contract is clearly inappropriate to describe 
and justify the current organisation of public intergenerational 
transfers to the elderly population with fixed benefits. Such a con-
tract would be a contract at the expense of a third party and a 
promise to expropriate the young generation to the extent needed 
to finance these transfers. Eventually, the working-age population 
would find themselves unable to finance these transfers. Although 
the term generational contract in the meaning of a social contract 
data from 57 countries, Ehrlich and Kim (2007) find a significant 
negative relationship between the introduction and expansion of 
pay-as-you-go pension systems and fertility.
Several measures indicate that the economic situation of young 
generations has been worsening in the last decade. Chen et al. 
(2018) show that the risk of poverty for the young and the work-
ing-age population has increased significantly since the financial 
crisis in 2008/09, while it has declined sharply for the elderly 
population. They conclude that the real incomes of the elderly 
population were effectively shielded from the crisis, while social 
protection systems are ill-equipped to provide assistance to the 
young. Using a range of different measures, Leach et al. (2016) 
generated a composite Intergenerational Fairness Index, which in-
dicates a decline in intergenerational fairness and living standards 
of the young generations. Because transfers to children are mainly 
provided by the parents, it is not surprising that researchers find a 
strong relationship between fertility and the economic conditions 
(Matysiak et al. 2018; Buckles et al. 2018). Worsening econom-
ic conditions for the young population could therefore lead to a 
vicious cycle of lower fertility and strong population ageing, an 
increasing burden through public transfers and a further reduc-
tion of fertility and investments in the child generation. Keeping 
a balance between transfers to children and transfers to the elderly 
population is of key importance for maintaining and recreating 
the human capital of societies and the maintenance of the inter-
generational support system in the long run. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we describe and 
analyse the relationship between transfers to the child generation 
and transfers to the elderly population using the concept of a gen-
erational contract (Section 2). The concept of a contract provides 
a framework that facilitates the analysis of economic relationships 
between generations and the analysis of challenges for the public 
transfer system due to population ageing. Second, the value of 
intergenerational transfer flows in 16 EU countries is measured 
using data from the European National Transfer Accounts and 
the European National Time Transfer Accounts (Section 3). We 
distinguish between private transfers of goods and services bought 
on the market, non-market transfers in the form of services such 
as household work and care, and public transfers. Third, we devel-
op and calculate a new indicator to analyse if the current level of 
intergenerational transfers comply with the generational contract 
and if there is a balance between transfers to children and transfers 
to the elderly population (Section 4). This measure shows that the 
age pattern and levels of intergenerational transfer flows is out of 
balance in most of the countries: human capital investments, in 
particular in terms of the number of children, are too low to ena-
ble the child generation to finance the rather generous transfers to 
the large elderly population in the future.
Intergenerational transfers and the concept of a generational 
contract
By using the concept of a contract to describe intergenerational 
transfers, we emphasise that the economic relationships between 
generations have characteristics that are usually associated with 
contractual relationships. This includes in particular reciprocity 
and the binding nature. However, the term generational contract 
is used in different contexts and with different meaning. Laslett 
(1992) raises the criticism that it is seldom clear what type of 
Keeping a balance between transfers to children and 
transfers to the elderly population is of key importance 
for maintaining and recreating the human capital of 
societies and the maintenance of the intergenerational 
support system in the long run.
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include the time and other economic resources that parents pro-
vide to their own children, but also publicly provided education 
and health services which are financed by all taxpayers. We can 
regard these transfers also as investment, because by transferring 
resources to children, a generation acquires a claim on part of the 
children’s future labour income. Once the children enter the la-
bour force, they pay part of their taxes and social contributions to 
finance pensions and health care for the elderly population. The 
description of intergenerational transfers as a contract between 
generations emphasises the binding character of these reciprocal 
transfer flows. The transfers to children are an essential, indispen-
sable part of the contract as they create the contribution base to 
finance the old-age transfers. The transfers to the elderly consti-
tute a well-protected part of the public distributional system: once 
young people enter the labour force, they are bound to pay taxes 
and social contributions on labour income.
Voluntarity is a necessary condition for a legal contract between 
parties to be valid and ensures a balance in the value of consider-
ations. A party that does not see an advantage in the mutual ex-
change offered in a contract would simply not enter the contract. 
The concept of a contract between two generations therefore de-
viates from the definition of a contract in the legal sense, since 
the child generation is forced into the generational contract. It is 
this characteristic that creates the problem of imbalances in the 
transfer system. The impossibility for the child generation to opt 
out of the generational contract enables the parental generation 
to extract a high and increasing share of the income of the young 
generation. As a result, it can become increasingly difficult for the 
young generation to finance transfers to the elderly population, 
to keep a decent living standard for themselves and to invest into 
their own children at the same time. This asymmetry requires the 
monitoring of the generational contract. Imbalances can seriously 
harm societies in the long run, as they hinder the reproduction 
and the recreation of human capital. 
The generational contract concept constitutes a flexible frame-
work for analysing economic transfers between generations. It 
is explicit about the type and direction of transfers that are the 
contribution of each generation to the contract. However, it says 
nothing about the exact size of transfers. This flexibility is desira-
ble as it allows adaption to different uses, for example the devel-
opment of different indicators for sustainability and intergenera-
tional fairness. Hammer et al. (2018) uses the concept to calculate 
a sustainability indicator for public transfers, taking the longevity 
of the elderly generation and the change in employment rates and 
retirement age of the child generation into account. They show 
that not even a considerable increase in the retirement age of the 
child generation would be able to eliminate the imbalances. The 
generational contract concept puts these imbalances in the inter-
generational transfer system into a context. For example, it is able 
to identify the difficulties of financing the public transfers to the 
is still used in public discourse, its use is heavily criticised (e.g. 
Komp and Van Tilburg 2010; Borchert 2004; Schüller 1996).
A generational contract between individuals
The notion of a generational contract should be used only when 
the relationship it describes actually has characteristics of a con-
tractual relationship. A contract is defined as “an agreement with 
specific terms between two or more persons or entities in which 
there is a promise to do something in return for a valuable ben-
efit known as consideration.”2 The consideration is something of 
objectively determined value given by both parties to a contract 
that induces them to enter into the agreement to exchange mutual 
performances.3 In the context of a generational contract, the con-
siderations are economic transfers between individuals belonging 
to different generations. 
Focusing on African countries, Whyte et al. (2008) and Roth 
(2008) use a comprehensive concept and describe the genera-
tional contract as the implicit expectation that parents will care 
for their children until they can care for themselves, and children 
will support their parents when they can no longer support them-
selves. Roth emphasises the contractual nature by describing the 
contributions to and benefits from this contract as being based on 
“the logic of debt”, with parents as the creditors of their children. 
The children pay off their debt with support for their parents in 
old age. In the countries analysed by Whyte et al. and Roth, the 
intergenerational transfers are indeed a mutual exchange between 
individuals, as public transfers are not common. Social norms and 
cultural values act as enforcement mechanism of mutual obliga-
tions between generations (Göransson 2013). The concept of a 
generational contract as agreement between individuals belonging 
to successive generations fits well in countries with a small welfare 
state and an important role of the family in the transfer system.
A contract between generations
In European societies, the transfers that comprise the generational 
contract are split between the family and the state. The transfers 
to children are mostly privately organised, while the transfers to 
the elderly are predominantly public transfers. Gál et al. (2017) 
estimate that about 80% of net transfers to children are private 
transfers, while the net transfers to the elderly tend towards 100% 
public transfers. Laslett (1992) argues that in societies with gen-
erous public health care and pension systems the transfers from 
parents to children are made without explicit expectation for re-
turn; these transfers can hardly be interpreted as resulting from an 
agreement between individuals. However, the parental generation 
does expect the child generation as a whole to finance their pen-
sions, health services and care in old age. Although public old- 
age provision acts as fertility insurance and does not require a 
certain individual to have children (Sinn 2004), it is nevertheless 
required for a generation as a whole. 
We therefore adapt the concept and think of intergenerational 
transfers as mutual exchange between two generations. The paren-
tal generation provides resources to the child generation until they 
enter the labour force and maintain themselves. These transfers 
The concept of a social contract is clearly inappropriate 
to describe and justify the current organisation of public 
intergenerational transfers to the elderly population 
with fixed benefits.
We […] think of intergenerational transfers as mutual 
exchange between two generations. The parental gen-
eration provides resources to the child generation until 
they enter the labour force and maintain themselves. […] 
Once the children enter the labour force, they pay part of 
their taxes and social contributions to finance pensions 
and health care for the elderly population.
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elderly as a consequence of low investments in the child genera-
tion. By including private transfers, it is better suited to discussing 
intergenerational fairness than generational accounting (Kotlik-
off 2017; Laub/Hagist 2017), a concept which focuses only on 
 public transfers.
Methodology and data: European National Transfer Accounts
Our estimates of intergenerational transfer flows are based on the 
European National Transfer Accounts data (Istenič et al. 2017) 
and the European Time Transfer Accounts data (Vargha et al. 
2017).4 National Transfer Accounts (NTA) are built up as an 
accounting system that introduces information on the relation-
ship between age and economic activity into National Accounts 
(for details, see UN 2013; Lee/Mason 2011). NTA measure how 
much labour- and asset-income each age group generates, how 
income is redistributed between age groups through public and 
private transfers, and how the disposable income is used for con-
sumption and saving. The dataset contains age-specific per capita 
averages of income, public transfer payments and public benefits, 
private transfer payments and benefits, consumption and saving. 
The production boundary in National Accounts, and consequent-
ly in NTA, excludes most of the services which are produced by 
households for their own use, such as housework and child care, 
or which are provided free of charge to other households. Infor-
mation about household production is usually introduced into 
National Accounts through so-called Household Satellite Accounts 
(Holloway et al. 2002; European Communities 2003; Abraham 
and Mackie 2005). Accounting for unpaid household work is of 
particular importance in the context of NTA, because the services 
produced through unpaid household work constitute important 
intergenerational transfers. Donehower (2013) developed a meth-
od to generate Household Satellite Accounts by age, to account 
for the intergenerational transfers in the form of unpaid work. 
The estimation of these accounts is mainly based on time use 
data, which is the reason for calling them National Time Transfer 
Accounts (NTTA). NTTA measure the age-specific production, 
the transfers and the consumption of services produced for the 
households’ own consumption. In addition, unpaid production 
activities for other households are included, such as care for 
grandchildren. Several attempts have been made by researchers to 
combine NTA and NTTA, providing comprehensive information 
on public and private transfers between age groups (Kluge 2014; 
Hammer 2014; Zannella 2015; Gál et al. 2015; Hammer et al. 
2015; Rentería et al. 2016; Gál et al. 2017). The results highlight 
the importance of transfers in the form of unpaid work, consti-
tuting clearly the largest transfer component of the total transfers 
to children. The Harmonized European Time Use Survey and the 
Multinational Time Use Survey provide comparable time use data 
for a range of countries. Both data sources have been used by 
Vargha et al. (2017) to generate comparable NTTA for 17 coun-
tries.5 
In this paper we combine the new European NTA data with Eu-
ropean NTTA, and NTTA based on the Austrian time use survey, 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the system of intergener-
ational transfers in 16 countries.6 The combination of NTA and 
NTTA is not straightforward and requires assumption and ap-
proximations, which we have to keep in mind when we analyse 
the results. NTA and NTTA refer to different years. While NTA 
refer to the year 2010, the NTTA, and the time use surveys they 
are based on, are in most countries considerably older.7 We use 
2010 as the base year and assume that age-specific intergenera-
tional transfers in the form of time are the same in 2010 as in 
the survey year. This assumption can be justified, as changes in 
time use are rather slow and we adjust the transfers so that out-
flows and inflows match over the total population. Unfortunately, 
NTA data are only available for the year 2010, which was in many 
countries characterised by unusually high government expendi-
ture relative to labour income and public revenues. This pattern 
affects in particular the results for public transfers in Latvia and 
Lithuania; both countries reduced government expenditure rela-
tive to labour income in the years after 2010. 
A controversial issue is the valuation of time use for production 
in monetary terms. NTA are based on National Accounts and 
therefore measured in market prices. For household work, such 
market prices do not exist. The usual approach is to value unpaid 
work activities with wage rates that could be earned on the market 
for similar activities. Unfortunately, there is no data source that 
would allow a consistent estimation of the hourly wage rates for 
domestic staff across all included countries. We therefore use the 
average country-specific net wage per hour to value the time spent 
on unpaid household work. 
In the remaining part of this section we give a quick overview of 
the combined NTA and NTTA transfer data, first the age-specific 
per capita values, then the total transfers between generations in 
the economy.
Intergenerational transfers per capita by type and age in 2010
Figure 1 plots the simple average of age-specific net transfer bene-
fits by type in the 16 countries. In order to make the transfer flows 
comparable, we standardised the transfer data before calculating 
the average. The transfers are measured as a share of the average la-
bour income of a full-time worker (YLFT) in each country, calcu-
lated using the measure of labour income as defined in NTA and 
data on working hours from the European Labour Force Survey. 
This standardisation eliminates differences in the level of hourly 
labour income across countries, but accounts for differences in 
employment rates. Two countries with similar levels of produc-
tivity per working hour and similar tax rates would be different 
regarding the levels of transfers when measured in terms of YLFT, 
with transfers being higher in the country with the higher em-
ployment rates.
The black area represents the public transfers, the dark-shaded 
area the private market transfers and the light-shaded area the pri-
vate non-market transfers. The basic pattern is highly simi lar in 
all of the countries. Children and young adults are net  receivers of 
transfers until their early twenties in all of the countries, on aver-
age until the age of 23. The non-market transfers to children are 
clearly the most important transfer component at a very young 
The generational contract concept constitutes a flexible 
framework for analysing economic transfers between 
generations.
The results highlight the importance of transfers in the 
form of unpaid work, constituting clearly the largest 
transfer component of the total transfers to children.
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age, amounting to almost one YLFT in the first years of life. We 
could interpret these numbers as childcare for young children 
corresponding to a full-time job. While the private non-market 
transfer benefits decline strongly with the age 
of the children, private market transfers and 
public transfers are higher for older children 
and peak around the age of 15 because of the 
public expenditure for formal education. Af-
ter the age of 15, there are more and more 
who enter the labour force and generate their 
own income, therefore the net transfer ben-
efits decline strongly after this age. On av-
erage, members of the age groups from 24 
to 62 are net providers of intergenerational 
transfers. The highest non-market transfers 
are provided by the population with young 
children, in most countries the age groups 
around 30-35. While the non-market trans-
fers decline with the age of the own children, 
the market transfers to children increase and 
peak at the age of 40-45. Total net contri-
butions to intergenerational transfers corre-
spond to more than 0.5 YLFT between the 
ages of 30 and 50. The population in old age 
are net receivers of intergenerational trans-
fers, mostly of public transfers. The average 
yearly values correspond to 0.3 - 0.4 YLFT. 
This seems small, but the measure of labour 
income in NTA includes all taxes on labour, 
including the employers’ social contributions 
and labour-based taxes on production. In 
many countries there is a small flow of pri-
vate non-market transfers from the elderly 
population to younger generations.
Total intergenerational transfers by type and life 
stage in 2010
The total transfers between generations in 
an economy is not only determined by the 
age-specific values per capita, but to a consid-
erable degree by the population structure. We 
use the pattern of net transfers to define the 
three life stages: childhood, working age and old age. Childhood 
is defined as young ages with positive average net transfer benefits, 
working age covers the ages with positive net contributions, and 
old age is characterised by positive net benefits. We derive a meas-
ure for the total net transfers between generations by multiplying 
the age-specific averages per capita with the corresponding pop-
ulation and adding up all age groups in childhood, working age 
and old age, respectively. Table 1 shows the country-specific age 
borders and the values of net transfer benefits relative to the total 
labour income in the economy. 
The sum over all life stages for non-market transfers is zero, as 
contributions have to equal the net benefits exactly. There are 
some cross-border flows of private market transfers; the sum over 
all life stages is therefore not necessarily zero. The sum of the pub-
Figure 1: Intergenerational transfers by type and age in 2010
The highest non-market transfers are provided by the 
population with young children, in most countries the 
age groups around 30-35.
Table 1: Aggregate intergenerational transfers by type and life stage as share of total labour 
income in 2010
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lic net benefits over the three life stages can be considerably differ-
ent from zero. First, there are considerable cross-border flows for 
public transfers. Second, public contributions can be used for in-
terest payments or savings and the public benefits can be financed 
out of dissaving or public asset income. In most countries part 
of the benefits is financed through dissaving, therefore the total 
contributions to the public transfer system are in most countries 
smaller than the total benefits. 
The values of total transfers to children range from 35% of total 
labour income in Germany to 57% in Lithuania. Because per-
sonal services are such an important component of transfers to 
children, the total transfer net contributions of the working-age 
population is high in the countries with large private non-mar-
ket transfers, such as Italy and Poland. In these two countries the 
value of transfer payments of the working-age population exceeds 
60% of total labour income. The transfers to the elderly consist 
mainly of public transfers and range between 11% of total labour 
income in Denmark to 20% in Finland.
Imbalances in the intergenerational transfer system
The level of age-specific per-capita transfers strongly depend on 
the age structure of the population. Many European countries ex-
perienced a baby boom after the Second World War, though with 
varying length and extent. The current population structure in 
these countries is characterised by a high share of the population 
being in working age and net contributors to the transfer system. 
Therefore the net transfer contributions per member of the work-
ing-age population can be low compared to the benefits received 
by children and the elderly. In the context of the generational con-
tract we can state that the parents of the baby boomers invested 
heavily in the child generation. Together with the educational ex-
pansion and high economic growth rates, this pattern enabled the 
expansion of the public health and pension systems, reflected in 
increasing levels of benefits and increasing life expectancy coupled 
with declining retirement age. The change in the age structure of 
the populations and the retirement of the baby boomers them-
selves, characterised by much lower fertility, requires adjustments 
in the level of old-age benefits. There is an imbalance between 
the, comparably low, investments in the young generation and the 
generous old-age benefits.
Intergenerational transfers by type from a life course perspective
In a first step, we calculate measures that provide information 
on the size of transfers individuals would receive and pay over 
the life course, given the size of age-specific transfers in 2010. 
The measures are based on a thought experiment. We assume 
that the cross-sectional age pattern of transfers in the year 2010 
corresponds to the transfer contributions and benefits of an indi-
vidual over the lifetime. This individual faces an age-specific mor-
tality corresponding to the age-specific rates observed in 2010.8 
We then calculate the amount of transfers that our hypothetical 
cross-section individual receives in childhood, the amount he/she 
transfers to children and the elderly during working life and the 
amount that he/she receives in old age. We want to emphasise 
that our analysis does not tell us anything about the transfers of a 
certain individual or member of a certain cohort. This would re-
quire longitudinal data for a long time-period, covering the whole 
life course of a generation. Our measures are designed to provide 
information on important characteristics of the pattern of inter-
generational transfers in a given year. The simulation of the life 
course values of transfers is used as a tool to derive intuitive and 
meaningful measures.
Total net transfers received in childhood Tyoung are calculated as the 
sum of expected transfers per capita at all young ages with positive 
net transfer benefits (Equation 1). The term  represents the net 
public transfer benefits at age i; the term Tmarket,i the private market 
transfers; and the term Tnon­market,i the private non-market transfers. 
The age groups included range from zero to , with  referring to the 
oldest age group in young age with positive net transfer benefits. 
We refer to this measure as expected transfers, because we adjust 
the age-specific NTA per capita values with survival probability. 
The measure of transfers paid during working age Twork is calcu-
lated as the sum of net transfer contributions over all age groups 
from l+1 to u-1, with u referring to the youngest age group in old 
age with positive net benefits (Equation 2). The total transfers in 
old age Told are calculated as the sum over all age groups from  up 
to 100 (Equation 3). Since transfer data in NTA are only availa-
ble until age 80+, for all older age groups we use the age-specific 
value at age 80. The Si stands for the survival probability until age 
i, calculated from cross-sectional mortality data. For i=100 the Si 
represents the life expectancy at age 100, given the mortality rates 
of 2010.
 
The results are shown in Table 2, reporting the value of expected 
transfers relative to YLFT by type and life stage for each country. 
The total value of transfers a child can expect until becoming net 
contributor to the transfer system ranges between 12.6 YLFT in 
Belgium and more than 19 YLFT in Poland, Slovenia and Bul-
garia. The differences across countries are mainly influenced by 
the amount of the private non-market transfers, ranging from less 
than 6 YLFT in Belgium and more than 10 YLFT in Poland. 
The cross-country differences in the value of public transfers and 
private market transfers are much lower: the simple average of the 
values across countries is 3.5 and 5.3 YLFT, respectively. 
The expected net contributions to the intergenerational transfer 
system in working age amount to 10 YLFT in Latvia and to about 
17 YLFT in Poland and Sweden. The level of the different types 
of transfers varies considerably across countries. Public transfer 
contributions amount to slightly more than 3 YLFT in Latvia and 
Lithuania and more than 8 YLFT in Sweden and Austria. The val-
ues of private non-market transfer contributions during working 
age range between slightly more than 3 YLFT in Latvia to more 
than 6 YLFT in Spain, Poland and the UK. However, the year 
2010 was exceptional for the former two countries, characterised 
There is an imbalance between the, comparably low, 
investments in the young generation and the generous 
old-age benefits.
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by high dissaving of the public sector and low contributions rela-
tive to benefits. The value of private market transfers in working 
age range between 3 and 4.7 YLFT. 
The value of public transfers in old age reflects the value of pub-
lic contributions and the size of the public sector. It ranges from 
slightly more than 3 YLFT in Bulgaria to more than 7 YLFT in 
Austria and Slovenia. There are only minor private net transfers 
to and from the elderly population in the form of private market 
transfers. In all of the countries the elderly population are net 
contributors in the form of private non-market transfers, but the 
values exceed 1 YLFT only in Latvia. These transfers reflect for 
example the involvement of the elderly population in taking care 
for their grandchildren.
The fourth column in Table 2 shows the difference between con-
tributions during working age and the benefits in childhood and 
old age. Obviously, the value of total average net transfers paid 
during working age is considerably lower than the transfers re-
ceived in childhood and old age. This pattern reflects the large 
share of the working-age population in most of the countries, who 
provide transfers for a comparably low number of children and, 
in relation to the working-age population, a 
comparably low number of elderly persons.
A measure of imbalances in the transfer system
We use the results from the previous section 
to evaluate the compatibility of the 2010 age 
patterns of transfers with the generational 
contract. Given these patterns, are the invest-
ments of the current working-age population 
in the young generations large enough to fi-
nance their old-age benefits when they enter 
retirement? For this purpose, we generate 
two sub-indicators. The first sub-indicator 
measures the number of children that can be 
supported and raised with the transfers that 
are provided to the child generation during 
working age. The second sub-indicator meas-
ures the number of net contributors to the 
transfer system that are required to finance 
the total amount of transfers to a person in 
old age. We then calculate the difference 
between these two measures, which can be 
interpreted as the number of additional chil-
dren and net contributors that would be re-
quired to finance the transfers to the elderly 
population.
For the first sub-indicator, the number of 
supported children, we assume that the net 
transfer benefits received in childhood meas-
ure the transfers that are required by a child 
to grow up and become a net contributor to 
the transfer system. The number of support-
ed children is calculated by dividing the total 
transfers to children that are provided during working age, with 
the total amount of transfers that is required in childhood. Since 
contributions in working age and benefits of children are of very 
similar size for the population as a whole, this sub-indicator ap-
proximates the average number of children of the working-age 
population. To derive a measure for the net transfer outflows in 
working age that are provided to children, the total outflows are 
split in the part transferred to children and a part transferred to 
the elderly. The split is based on the relative size of total net ben-
efits of children and the net benefits of the elderly population by 
type of transfer (taken from Table 1). Private transfers go almost 
exclusively to children while public transfers are mainly transfers 
to the elderly population. Additionally, we assume that the net 
contributions of private transfers of the population in old age are 
directed to the young generation, thereby reducing the costs of 
children for the working-age population. The results are shown in 
the first column of Table 3. The values range from 0.5 in Latvia 
to 0.88 in Sweden. In other words, the transfers that an average 
couple provides in working age finances the net benefits for one 
child in Latvia and 1.76 children in Sweden. 
The total value of transfers a child can expect until 
becoming net contributor to the transfer system ranges 
between 12.6 YLFT in Belgium and more than 19 YLFT in 
Poland, Slovenia and Bulgaria.
Table 2: Simulation of intergenerational transfers by life stage and type. Based on the 2010 
transfer and mortality pattern
Private transfers go almost exclusively to children while 
public transfers are mainly transfers to the elderly pop-
ulation.
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The second sub-indicator measures the expected net transfers re-
ceived in old age relative to the transfers to the elderly that are 
provided in working age. It can be interpreted as the number of 
working-age contributors that are required to finance the old-age 
net benefits. The values are reported in the second column of Ta-
ble 3 and range from 1.11 in Bulgaria to 2.53 in Spain. The low 
values for Bulgaria reflect the low level of public transfers and the 
comparably low life expectancy. The high values for Spain can 
be explained with the low tax rates on labour, the high unem-
ployment rates and a large dissaving of the public sector in 2010. 
Public dissaving enables the financing of public old-age benefits 
without an immediate increase of the contributions. The value of 
about 1.2 in Italy, for example, means that over the whole work-
ing life 1.2 net contributors provide the total transfers that are 
expected by a person in old age. The system would be balanced 
if fertility is about 2.4 children per women and the number of 
supported children is 1.2. 
The difference between the two sub-indicators is our measure 
of interest (third column in Table 3). It measures the number 
of contributors per person that would be required, additional to 
their own children, to enable them to finance the transfers to the 
elderly without increasing the contribution rate or reducing the 
benefits. The values range from 0.37 in Sweden to 1.93 in Spain. 
The value of 1 in Slovenia means that it would require an increase 
in fertility of 2 children per women to have enough contributors 
financing the transfers to the elderly population. We have to con-
clude that in all of the analysed countries the intergenerational 
transfer system is considerably out of balance. 
Discussion
The importance of private transfers is also the focus in Gál et al. 
(2017). In a similar way as this paper, they combine NTA and 
NTTA results to get a comprehensive picture of intergenerational 
transfers. Observing the larger amount of transfers provided to 
children, they conclude that we live in a child­orientated conti­
nent. However, whether more resources should be transferred to 
children or to the elderly population is not a meaningful question. 
Obviously, a child requires a much higher level of transfers than 
an average person does in old age. All children have to acquire 
the physical strength and the cognitive abilities in the first place 
through a lengthy learning process. During this process, they rely 
on transfers from their parents and public transfers. A balanced 
transfer system has to reflect the larger amount of resources and 
transfers that are required by the children. Our indicator shows 
that despite the much larger value of transfers to children, these 
investments are still too low to enable the child generation to 
 finance the old-age transfers to the parental generation.
The concept of a generational contract describes the fundamen-
tal relationship between transfers to children and transfers to the 
elderly population. Our results indicate that the rather generous 
public old-age benefits observed in 2010 will have to adjust to 
the lower investments in children of the population that enter 
retirement in the coming decades. Taking the net transfers relative 
to labour income as a benchmark, the observed pattern is unfair 
from a generational perspective. The current working-age popula-
tion has to provide a large share of resources to the elderly popu-
lation, while having fewer resources for themselves and their own 
children. As a consequence, they themselves will receive much 
lower benefits in old age.
How could such imbalances be avoided in the first place? Auto-
matic balancing mechanisms would be desirable. These mecha-
nisms should be simple, to allow individuals to predict their con-
tributions and their benefits; furthermore, they should not create 
incentives that intensify the imbalance; and they should be fair 
– thus, they should not distribute from those who invest in the 
child generation to those who do not. The current pension rules 
in most of the countries do not have any of these characteristics. 
Pension rules rewarding labour income and transfers to the el-
derly provide disincentives for having children, as in most coun-
tries children are associated with the reduction of paid work. For 
the same reason they redistribute from those who have children 
and invest in the human capital of societies to those who do not. 
Furthermore, they largely ignore the capacities of the young gen-
eration to provide for these transfers. A possible solution would 
be the suggestion of Sinn (2013), who proposes a change to a 
funded pension system with a pay-as-you-go component for those 
who have children. He argues that childless couples could save the 
resources that families with children have to use for the intergen-
erational transfers to children.
Summary and conclusion
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we develop a 
framework for analysing intergenerational transfer flow using the 
concept of a generational contract. Intergenerational transfers to 
children and to the elderly population are best understood as mu-
tual exchange between two generations. It requires human capital 
We have to conclude that in all of the analysed countries 
the intergenerational transfer system is considerably out 
of balance.
Table 3: The generational balance of transfers
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investment in the child generation to enable the child generation 
to finance the public transfers to the elderly population once they 
enter employment. The public transfer system and the challenges 
due to population ageing cannot be understood without taking 
public and private transfers into account. 
Second, we use age-specific data on transfer contributions and 
benefits provided in NTA and NTTA to quantify intergenera-
tional transfers, including private transfers to children in the form 
of household work. Using the average transfer pattern of 16 EU 
countires in 2010, the value of total transfers to a child amounts 
to 16 times the yearly labour income of a full-time worker. The 
net transfers to the elderly are mostly public transfers, amounting 
to six times the yearly labour income of a full-time worker. 
Third, based on the transfer data we develop and calculate an 
indicator that measures the extent of imbalances in the transfer 
system. In the countries analysed, the transfers to children pro-
vided by one person during working age can support about 0.7 
children, on average. However, to finance the total transfers of a 
person in old age it requires almost 1.6 contributors, on average. 
Such a situation can only be maintained because most European 
countries experienced a baby boom in some years between the 
Second World War and the 1980s. The generation that is current-
ly in retirement, the parents of the baby boomers, invested con-
siderably more in the young generation than the current work-
ing-age population. The imbalance in the transfer system cannot 
be maintained; a reduction of transfers to the elderly population 
relative to the average labour income and an increase in the con-
tributions of the child generation is inevitable.
To make transfers predictable and to maintain a balance of in-
tergenerational transfers, an automatic adjustment mechanism 
of old-age benefits would be highly desirable. These mechanisms 
ideally take the transfers to children into account, at the level of a 
generation as well as on an individual level. Pension rules that take 
the number and education of children into account could help to 
avoid such imbalances. 
Notes
1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological devel-
opment and demonstration under grant agreement no 613247. 
This paper uses data from Eurostat, European Labour Force Sur-
vey, 2010. The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the 
data lies entirely with the authors.
2 Collins Dictionary of Law (2006). Viewed on 28 July 2016 
from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/contract.
3 Collins Dictionary of Law. (2006). Viewed on 28 July 2016 
from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consideration.
4 The data can be accessed on www.wittgensteincentre.org/ntada-
ta (accessed on 6 March 2018).
5 NTA and NTTA data can be downloaded from www.wittgen-
steincentre.org/ntadata (viewed on 28 September 2017).
6 Austrian NTTA is based on: Statistics Austria, Zeitverwend-
ungserhebung 2008/09.
7 The reference years of the time use surveys are the following: 
Austria 2008/09, Belgium 2005, Bulgaria 2002, Germany 2002, 
Denmark 2001, Estonia 2000, Spain 2003, Finland 2000, France 
1999, Italy 2003, Lithuania 2003, Latvia 2003, Poland 2004, 
Sweden 2001, Slovenia 2001, United Kingdom 2005.
8 Source: EUROSTAT, population and number of deaths by age 
in 2010.
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